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Highlights
x Supplier –buyer relationships often exhibit power differentials and dependence.
x Relation-specific IT, embeddedness and dependence lead to supplier benefits.
x Embeddedness does not result in a supplier appropriating benefits.
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x A supplier must use a buyer’s dependence on a supplier to appropriate benefits.
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Abstract
The relationships between suppliers and buyers are often characterised by power differentials
and dependence at the same time. This leads to the ability of a powerful buyer to benefit more
from the relationship than the supplier. We examine how a supplier can strengthen its use of
relation-specific IT with embeddedness to appropriate its share of relational benefits. We
developed and tested a model of supplier relation-specific IT use, embeddedness, and buyer
dependence on supplier. The results showed that embeddedness did not lead directly to the
sharing of relational benefits; rather the appropriation of relational benefits is derived from buyer
dependence.
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and dependence at the same time. This leads to the ability of a powerful buyer to benefit more
from the relationship than the supplier. We examine how a supplier can strengthen its use of
relation-specific IT with embeddedness to appropriate its share of relational benefits. We
developed and tested a model of supplier relation-specific IT use, embeddedness, and buyer
dependence on supplier. The results showed that embeddedness did not lead directly to the
sharing of relational benefits; rather the appropriation of relational benefits is derived from buyer
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1.

Introduction
Proponents of the resource-based view of the firm have shown that firms with resources

and capabilities that are rare, valuable, nonsubstitutable, and difficult to imitate will achieve
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superior and sustainable firm performance over competing firms [4]. However, trading

partnerships have become more prevalent in business today and this important unit of analysis
deserves more study [27]. For example, suppliers and buyers often form partnerships to combine
resources, develop unique and valuable interoganisational assets, and create relational benefits
[26]. The relational view of competitive advantage explains this phenomenon since a firm’s
resources and capabilities may extend beyond firm boundaries to be embedded in interfirm
routines and processes [27].

The literature on business-to business (B2B) ecommerce demonstrates how relation-
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specific information technology (IT) is used to create relational benefits through knowledge and
information sharing [77,84,67,13,91]. However, much of this research focuses on how the
relational benefits that are created by relation-specific IT use are appropriated by buyers at the
expense of their suppliers [1,64,67,66,91,61]. These results occur since partnerships often exist
in a power regime where either the supplier or the buyer dominates [19]. However, even when a
supplier has a power advantage over a buyer that advantage does not enhance supplier benefits
[37].

Therefore, we pose the question of what can a supplier do to appropriate its share of
relational benefits? To address our research question, we take a supplier’s perspective and utilise
the relational view to develop a research model that contains the elements for a supplier to
appropriate its share of the partnership benefits. The relational view states that relation-specific
assets (in our context, a relation-specific IT system) can create relational benefits if there are
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complementary resources and capabilities, knowledge-sharing routines and effective governance
[27]. Given that relational benefits are already earned by a supplier-buyer partnership, we

to ineffective relational governance.
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advocate that the inability for a supplier to appropriate relational benefits is most likely attributed

Embeddedness between a supplier and a buyer is often cited as a key capability for

creating and sharing relational benefits because it allows for enhanced knowledge-sharing and is
an informal self-enforcing mechanism for relational governance [37,88,27,87]. Embeddedness
involves information sharing, joint problem solving, socialisation and communication [87]. In
the context of the management information systems (MIS) literature, embeddedness is a

managerial and relational capability that complements relation-specific IT in pursuit of relational
benefit sharing [64,84,63,27,18,61,4]. We test whether relation-specific IT use and
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embeddedness is associated with both supplier and buyer benefits.

From a buyer’s perspective, the relational view approach suggests that, by increasing
their dependence on a smaller set of suppliers, buyers can increase their benefits from the
partnership through knowledge sharing and investments in relation-specific assets [84,67,27,18].
Furthermore, the joint ownership of relation-specific resources and capabilities fosters partner
dependence [63,70]. According to resource dependency theory (RDT), this dependence is also an
informal self-enforcing governance mechanism for the distribution of the relational value in a
partnership [27]. Therefore, we utilise RDT as a complement to the relational view and measure
a buyer’s dependence on a supplier, and test the association between embeddedness, buyer
dependence on supplier and supplier benefits in our research model to determine whether a
supplier can foster this dependence to appropriate their share of the relational benefits.

3
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In sum, we address a gap in current research on a supplier’s perspective regarding the use
of relation-specific IT and relational benefit sharing by examining how a supplier can
appropriate its share of relational benefits in the presence of powerful buyers using

2.

Theory and hypothesis development
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embeddedness and buyer dependence on supplier.

The relational view of competitive advantage predicts that relational benefits are

developed from four sources: (1) relation-specific assets, (2) knowledge sharing routines, (3)
complementary resources and capabilities, and (4) effective governance [27]. We propose that
within a partnership, the relation-specific IT system or system that partner firms use as a relationspecific asset, develops embeddedness between the partners that fosters deeper knowledge

sharing, and serves as an informal self-enforcing form of relational governance that ultimately
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allows a supplier to leverage buyer dependence on supplier to appropriate its share of relational
benefits.

2.1. Embeddedness capability

The logic of embeddedness was first referred to by Emerson [28] in his research into
power dependence relationships. In partnerships with differential power and resource
dependence, Emerson states that the partners in a relationship are being controlled by the
relationship itself. The relationship’s controlling nature reflects the logic of embeddedness,
which results in each partner giving heightened attention to the responses and attitudes of the
other, such that the quality of the relationship becomes one of the main determinants of a
satisfactory business partnership [60]. In fact, partnerships with power differentials and resource
dependence can interpret ambiguities in their partners’ behaviours in a positive rather than
negative light [37,68]. For example, a supplier-buyer relationship in the automotive
4
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manufacturing industry is characterised by power differentials and high dependence at the same
time. It was demonstrated that this high level of commitment to the relationship led toward an
orientation for long-term, effective conflict resolution, and the willingness of partners to forego
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immediate self-interest for the benefit of the relationship [52,53].

Dacin et al. [20], Uzzi [87] and Granovetter [36] define embeddedness as a process by
which the quality and structure of relations among actors shape economic actions in ways that
differ from standard economic organisational-centric explanations. A supplier and buyer form a
business friendship which helps to ensure that relationship benefits are shared because partners
can respond and adapt to each other in areas not specifically covered by a formal written contract
[22,73,27,87]. That is, embeddedness provides informal and social controls to govern what a
formal written contract cannot completely cover. Embeddedness yields the utility of shared
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understanding of reciprocally beneficial behaviour as a result of trust, exchange of sensitive and
sometimes confidential information, rational knowledge sharing routines, and joint problem
solving arrangements [47,13].

In summary, embeddedness is a relation-specific capability that manages the implicit yet
congruent expectations and assumptions about information sharing, joint planning, joint problem
solving, socialisation and communications [27,87,36]. The expectations and assumptions should
come from past commercial interactions, values and experiences, and capture the give and take
required to govern the commercial and social needs of each party [87].
2.2. Relation-specific IT use
Relation-specific IT is used to create relational benefits through knowledge and
information sharing [77,84,67,13,91]. When a supplier and a buyer use an interorganisational IT
system, the relation-specific activities transpire in specialised and unique ways that is consistent
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with the relational view to allow the partners to learn how to leverage their relationship and
create value that cannot be replicated outside of the partnership [80,84,22,13,12,48].
In practice, IT systems are used for automating and informating [21], and efficiency and
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effectiveness [64]. These two uses of IT have implications for partnerships since performance is
often dependent on operating efficiencies derived from automation, and operating effectiveness
derived from interpreting and acting on information. In the strategic management literature, IT
use for automating and efficiency is similar to the concept of exploitation; and informating and
effectiveness is similar to the concept of exploration [29,44,59].

Known as exploitation, a supplier can use the knowledge and information in the IT

system to improve operating efficiencies with their buyer through increased standardisation,

tighter process controls and automation in order to achieve quantifiable benefits in the form of
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cost reductions, process consistency and process efficiency [84,6,59]. In contrast, a supplier can
engage in exploration by using the knowledge and information in the IT system to solve old
problems, discover ways to innovate, invent and build new capabilities, enter new lines of
business or improve absorptive capacity [84,6,59]. Since the IT use for exploitation is required
for short-term partnership viability and IT use for exploration is required to sustain long-term
partnership viability, they must coexist and be undertaken in parallel [51,29,76]. Therefore, we
define relation-specific IT use as the use of relation-specific IT systems for both exploitation and
exploration.

The issue that arises from relation-specific IT use is that the relational benefits are often
appropriated by a powerful buyer at the expense a supplier [84,19,67,66,91]. Even a powerful
supplier is unable to appropriate its fair share of relational benefits [37]. Therefore, we propose
that when relation-specific IT use is associated with embeddedness, a supplier will likely be able

6
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to appropriate its share of relational benefits. Relation-specific IT use creates relational benefits
from unique and valuable knowledge and information, and embeddedness is a capability that
informally self-governs relational benefit sharing through information sharing, joint planning,
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and joint problem solving using a social context involving business friendships.
2.3. Relation-specific IT and embeddedness

Relation-specific IT “use” starts with a physical interorganisational IT system [65,41] and
evolves into information sharing, joint planning, joint problem solving, socialisation and

communications to maximise relational benefits. Initially, relation-specific IT use by a supplier
provides the opportunity to open communications between the partners about the insights gained.
These initial discussions create interaction and familiarisation that establishes a low level of
embeddedness. As discussions, interactions and familiarisation continue, reciprocity builds,
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leading to more collaborative relations between the supplier and buyer. These relations open a
supplier and buyer to knowledge sharing, and the partners partake in deeper provision of
solution, support, and service [47]. The closer relations establish a medium level of
embeddedness. When a high level of embeddedness is reached, proprietary information and
knowledge about relationship strategies, problems, needs, and service levels are likely to be
shared and debated. Therefore, with a business friendship formed, a supplier and buyer can
respond and adapt to each other in areas that cannot be completely written into a formal contract.
Therefore, we hypothesise the following:
H1:

Relation-specific IT use by a supplier is positively associated with embeddedness.

2.4. Embeddedness and relational benefit sharing
Since embeddedness elevates a supplier and buyers understanding of each other, their
values, attributes, and goals will tend to converge [37]. The partners tend to develop mutual
7
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empathy and a focus on joint success, embracing a long-term horizon for the relationship.
Partners become more structurally similar [25] and this convergence improves communications
and negotiations, reduces operational frictions and avoids unnecessary transaction costs [37].
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Consequently, this facilitates the development of a stable business relationship that promotes
continuity, and provides the ingredients for superior value creation and distribution [85]. For
example, in a partnership that exhibits some embeddedness, a supplier and buyer may use the
relation-specific IT system to analyse the relationship’s purchasing data with the objective of
understanding purchasing patterns, and whether they meet requirements to optimise relational
benefits. This type of analysis provides benefits for the partnership by providing benefits to each
partner unique to their role as a supplier and as a buyer. The analysis may show that if the buyer
switches to a recommended product substitute and increases its order size by aggregating
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purchase orders, the buyer would be able to reduce its purchasing costs as well as provide

additional margins for the supplier. Taken together, embeddedness reduces transaction costs,
provides greater resilience in the face of conflict, and increases opportunities for value creation
and distribution for each partner. Therefore, we hypothesise that:
H2a: Embeddedness is positively associated with supplier benefits.
H2b: Embeddedness is positively associated with buyer benefits.
2.5. Resource dependence

In a partnership, resource dependency theory (RDT) [70] states that such relationships
exist because of: (1) the importance of a shared resource; (2) lack of other partners that possess
that resource; and (3) the discretion of the partnership to deploy the resource [63]. However,
suppliers and buyers will often have differing levels of resource dependence and the imbalance
in dependence allows for a power differential that causes relational benefits to be appropriated by
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the more powerful partner [37,63,18]. Embeddedness can bring such dependence into balance. A
supplier can increase the dependence of a more powerful buyer with embeddedness by
reminding the buyer of their valuable and unique resources and capabilities, and reinforce a
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buyer’s recognition and appreciation of the resources and capabilities that are provided [37]. The
common empathy, values, attitudes, collaboration and goals consequently become an important
set of resources for a buyer to rely on to motivate and support the relationship’s value creating
and sharing potential [38]. Studies in the banking industry and apparel industry have

demonstrated how embeddedness has balanced power differentials while maintaining heavy joint
dependence [88,87]. Despite the increased frequency of operational tensions that can generally
be associated with dependent ties and power differentials, embeddedness reduced the residual
feelings of conflict in joint dependence [49]. Therefore, we hypothesise the following:

buyers.

Embeddedness is positively associated with buyer dependence on supplier in powerful
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H3:

2.6. Dependence and relational benefit sharing
Embeddedness is a key capability that facilitates the structural and attitudinal
convergence of a supplier and a buyer [25]. They become business allies, and develop greater
overlap in their goals because there are fewer structural and attitudinal impediments [49]. RDT
predicts that the emergence of this behavioural solidarity increases buyer dependence on supplier
and reduces the initial relative dependence and power differential favouring a buyer. The
increase in buyer dependence on supplier, in turn, allows a supplier to appropriate benefits from
the partnership. Therefore, the effect of embeddedness on supplier benefits is mediated by buyer
dependence on supplier. A high level of buyer dependence on supplier also imposes a high cost
for a buyer to switch [63]. Consequently, a supplier is able to capture incremental sales from a

9
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buyer; appropriate additional margins for itself through discretionary changes in prices and
charges; and/or reduces its management costs because a supplier does not have to spend as much
time in maintaining the relationship with its buyers. Therefore, we hypothesise that:
Buyer dependence on supplier mediates the association between embeddedness and

supplier benefits.
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H4:

Buyer dependence on supplier also intervenes on the association between buyer benefits
and supplier benefits. Since a buyer derives benefits from embeddedness in a partnership, such
benefits are deemed to be fostered from interactions that involve trust, exchange of sensitive
information, knowledge distribution, joint problem solving, and shared goals [47,13]. A supplier
and a buyer would bring together a much “larger” set of capabilities than any one firm can

muster, heightening the level of buyer dependence on supplier [27,42]. The increase in buyer
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dependence on supplier, in turn, would allow a supplier to appropriate benefits from the

partnership, mediating the effect of buyer benefits. Buyer dependence on supplier is created
because these benefits are valuable and unique to the relationship. Therefore, we hypothesise the
following:
H5:

Buyer dependence on supplier mediates the association between buyer benefits and

supplier benefits.

Fig. 1 shows the research model that is developed and tested in our study.
------------------------------Insert Fig. 1 about here
------------------------------
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3.

Research method

3.1. Supplier selection
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The supplier chosen was an independent Australian office products company with sales
revenue of approximately A$1.16 billion (profit A$57.15 million) in 2010. It was subsequently
bought out in 2011 by a U.S. office products company after showing above industry average
growth in sales revenue and profits since the early/mid 2000s. There were many case studies
testifying its success in supplier-buyer relationships. The office products company sold office
supplies, IT solutions, business furniture, facility supplies, print management, and promotional
marketing.

A survey was administered to gather the data for testing the research model in Fig. 1.
This is because relation-specific IT use, embeddedness and buyer dependence on supplier are not

Ac
ce
pt
ed

amenable to archival recording. We chose a single supplier with many powerful buyers to

perform an undiluted analysis of a supplier-buyer relationship with only buyer-side controls.
This eliminated statistical bias that may be created by selecting a proxy variable to control for the
varying levels of differential power that will exist in a sample of suppliers and their relationships
with buyers.

The variables of interest in our study were best understood from the dyadic nature of the
relationships between a supplier and its buyers. Therefore, we randomly selected a sample of the
office product company’s dominant buyers and controlled for the influence that the level of
technology use, duration of the partnership, and size of the buyer might have on embeddedness,
buyer benefits, buyer dependence on supplier and supplier benefits in each supplier-buyer
relationship. To control for the level of technology use, we introduced a variable to measure the
extent to which the buyer purchases electronically versus other purchasing methods. Buyer
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benefits, buyer dependence on supplier, and supplier benefits are likely to be higher on average
for buyers that extensively used electronic purchasing than for those that use it less extensively.
We captured the duration of each supplier-buyer relationship to control for the influence that
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short-term versus long-term supplier-buyer relationship may have on buyer benefits, buyer

dependence on supplier, and supplier benefits. To control for the effect of the varying levels of
power or dominance that buyers may have on embeddedness, buyer benefits, buyer dependence
on supplier, and supplier benefits, we included a measure for the size of each account as a
proportion of all of the supplier’s accounts.

Choosing an office products supplier also allowed us to control for the effects of physical
resource dependence. These suppliers provide commoditised products and services, and this

allowed us to isolate and test the effects of relation-specific IT use, embeddedness and buyer
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dependence on supplier without the confounding effects of unique and valuable physical
products in a partnership.

3.2. Survey development

A supplier-buyer relationship was defined by a formal written contract between a supplier
and a buyer organisation or their autonomous divisions. The measures for relation-specific IT use
and embeddedness were derived from a supplier and its buyers using a developmental method
that involved focus groups with the structured approach of nominal group techniques [89,90]. A
supplier focus group and a buyer focus group were carried out separately to develop factors from
each point of view of the relationship. The aim was to derive an exhaustive list of factors around
relation-specific IT use for exploitation and exploration, and dimensions of a supplier-buyer
relationship that yielded relationship benefits. Account managers were chosen to represent the
supplier as they were the point of contact for buyers. Purchasing managers were chosen in buyer
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organisations because they were responsible for the trading agreement with account managers.
This development procedure also minimised common method bias. Each group was taken
through a half day four step procedure. The four steps were: (1) presentation and discussion of
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the focus group objectives; (2) individual generation of items that would be used to form the
factors; (3) group generation of factors; and (4) categorising (essential versus nonessential) and
ranking (by number) the factors based on the impact on relationship benefits.

Supplier relation-specific IT use for exploitation measured the extent to which the

relation-specific IT system provided an easy, convenient, and flexible system for computer use;
assisted with business process reengineering initiatives; a desktop delivery programme that

dispensed with a centralised stationery department and warehouse; and the ability to have a

single source supplier that leverages large volumes of consolidated office products and services.
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Supplier relation-specific IT use for exploration measured the extent to which the IT system was
used as a basis for strategic procurement analysis conducted by the supplier; expenditure control
and management reporting assistance; account manager-assisted purchasing decision making;
and a comprehensive management reporting package that incorporated benchmarking and trend
analysis. Since we used a developmental method to produce the underlying factors that gave rise
to observed scores for supplier relation-specific IT use for exploitation and exploration, we
recognised these indicators as being reflective and accounted for variance among the observed
indicators [2,23,14,31]. As relation-specific IT use for exploitation and exploration are
conceptualised as distinct uses of relation-specific IT, we operationalise these constructs as
reflective second-order constructs [50,84].
Consistent with Uzzi [87], our structured approach of nominal group techniques used in
the focus groups recommended that we measure embeddedness as the extent to which there was
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sharing of proprietary information and joint problem solving in the supplier-buyer relationship.
The focus group also recommended that we measure the extent of value-adding discussions and
frequency of performance reviews between the supplier and buyer. Since embeddedness is a
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socio-psychological concept that is observed, reflective indicators were applied [2,23,14,31].
We sourced and modified reflective measures of buyer dependence on supplier from Cool
and Henderson [18] and Subramani [84]. On each side of the relationship, benefits are often

measured by metrics defined by sales, sales growth, profit margin on sales, return on investment
(ROI), and growth in ROI [9]. These organisational-level measures are the primary benchmarks
by which most stakeholders in an organisation are rewarded [30,54,11,7]. We modified these
measures and defined relationship-level constructs from a supplier and a buyer perspective
respectively. Therefore, supplier benefit measures included: (1) incremental sales from the
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buyer; (2) additional margins through product prices and service charges; and (3) reduced buyer
management costs. Buyer benefits were measured on the reduction in purchasing costs from the
supplier.

Appendix A shows the supplier survey, Appendix B shows the buyer survey, and
Appendix C shows the control measures and demographic questions. We collected our survey
responses and assembled our case data using the tailored design method outlined in Dillman
[24]. For analysis and modelling, we defined each case as a set of supplier responses for the
relation-specific IT use, and supplier benefits; and buyer responses for embeddedness, buyer
dependence on supplier, and buyer benefits. Assembling our case data in this way also allowed
us to examine all the supplier-buyer dyads with the aim of eliminating common method bias
[71].
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3.3. Survey sample
The office supplies company provided a database of buyer organisations that was
classified by account manager and their corresponding buyer’s purchasing manager contact
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details. In total, there were more than 24,000 buyer contracts or agreements that were looked
after by 226 account managers. To maximise sample size, we randomly emailed surveys to as
many 12 purchasing managers for each account manager (we expected a response rate of about
20% or a little more than two responses for each account manager). We then aimed for each

account manager to complete no more than two surveys corresponding to two buyer responses.
We took this approach to minimise survey fatigue and response bias on the part of account
managers from having to respond to more than two surveys.

After adjusting for account managers that had resigned and buyers that did not have an
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assigned account manager at the time, 2,324 buyers were cleared for surveying by account

managers. Dissemination of the buyer survey yielded 223 (9.59%) responses that were complete
enough to provide data for the constructs in the research model. The 223 surveys were sent out to
the supplier account managers, and 77 (34.53% of the 223 surveys) provided fully completed
responses that could be paired to the buyers’ responses.
Prior to analysing our measurement and structural model, supplier-buyer dyads were
screened for accuracy, outliers, normality, early and late response bias, nonresponse bias and
missing data. A test using Little’s MCAR test [56] indicated that the data was missing at random,
and data was imputed using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) as recommended by Hair et
al. [39].
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4.

Model analysis and results
The descriptive statistics for the buyer responses to control variables and demographic

questions are shown in Table 1. On average, the responding buyers have been with the office
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products supplier for 4.21 years. During that time, buyers have had about 2.18 account managers.
Buyers estimated that their spends were over A$382,000 per year on average. About 82.11% of
the buyers expected that their spending would increase by an average of 2.64% in the next year.
Some 74.92% of buyer purchases were conducted electronically.

------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here

-------------------------------

Account managers also provided their responses to control variables and demographic
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questions about their buyers, and this is shown in Table 2. Based on two tailed t tests of the pairs
in Tables 1 and 2, there were no significant differences between the buyer and supplier estimates
of the partnership characteristics at p < 0.05, except for the account managers’ estimates on
buyer spend. Despite explicit instructions that the definition of the supplier-buyer relationship is
the formal contract or agreement with a purchasing manager, the discrepancy occurred because
some account managers responded to the survey by viewing the buyer account as the whole
parent organisation (organisational-level) rather than the formal contract or agreement with the
purchasing manager in a division of the buyer’s parent organisation (relationship-level).
------------------------------Insert Table 2 about here
-------------------------------
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We analysed our data using the partial least squares technique (PLS) [79]. We chose PLS
for several reasons. First, it is capable of analysing data models with small sample sizes that are
potentially non-normal [34,35]. That said, there is still considerable debate over the efficacy and
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choice of statistical techniques (i.e., covariance-based structural equation modelling, PLS, and/or
regression) to use when analysing hypothesised causal relationships between constructs (see

[34,35,58,57,78]). Regardless of the choice of statistical technique, the purpose of analysis is to
ensure that the measurement model has adequate reliability and validity, and to determine the
statistical significance of path estimates so that the findings can be used to enhance the existing
knowledge of the MIS research community.

Second, with our complex research model, PLS may have an advantage over regression
since it can analyse the whole model as a unit, rather than dividing it into pieces [35].1 This
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contrast with regression, where equal weights are normally given to all indicators, and each

dependent composite construct and all its predictors are analysed separately using ordinary least
squares [34,35].2 We performed a multiple regression analysis using both equal weights and
factor weights given to all indicators and found results that were consistent with PLS.3
Third, PLS lends itself to the somewhat exploratory nature of this research [40,35]. We
were concerned with identifying potential relationships and their predictive power more than the
magnitude of those relationships (see our Stone’s [83] and Geisser’s [33] Q2 tests results in
1

PLS simultaneously analyses the measures and interactions among latent constructs to evaluate the quality of the
measurement and structural properties of the research model. PLS allows the correct parameterisation of the latent
constructs for our research model [34]. PLS iterates through a process to find the optimal indicator weights for each
construct, such that the overall R2 for all dependent constructs is maximised [35]. The approach then uses the
indicator weights to calculate construct scores which are used to determine the final path estimates. The standard
deviation of those path estimates is determined with bootstrapping.
2
There is no iteration involved. Standard deviations of each path estimates are determined using normal distribution
theory.
3
In a comparison of PLS with regression and covariance-based structural equation modelling using well-behaved
data, Goodhue et al. [35] found no advantage of PLS over other techniques for non-normal data or for small sample
size. However, they stated that “actual” field data may exhibit more challenging characteristics.
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section 4.2.2) [40,35]. Fourth, we did not have any distributional assumptions about our data, and
PLS is robust against moderate departures from normality [40].
Fifth, PLS can handle a relatively small but complex model with a relatively large
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number of independent latent constructs and measures for a given sample size [40]. The

minimum sample rule for PLS that is commonly cited states that the sample size should be at
least 10 times the number of incoming paths to the construct with the most incoming paths

[3,15]. Since there are three paths at most, our sample size should be a minimum of 30. Our

sample of 77 cases meets this criterion.4 However, recent research has suggested that researchers
should not rely on the “rule of 10” for PLS. Rather, for a more accurate assessment, researchers
need to specify the effect size for each regression analysis and compare them against the power
tables provided by Cohen [17] [35]. In our analysis and results in section 4.2.2, we calculated the
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effect sizes associated with our structural model using Chin’s [14] f2 tests. Finally, PLS
overcomes the multicollinearity problem since its factors are orthogonal [40].

Fig. 2 shows a fully saturated: (1) measurement model – the results of the relationship
between the observed survey measures and corresponding latent constructs relation-specific IT
use, embeddedness, buyer dependence on supplier, two types of buyer benefits, and two types of
supplier benefits; and (2) structural model – the results from testing the hypothesised and
emergent paths between the latent constructs.

------------------------------Insert Fig. 2 about here
-------------------------------

4

Goodhue et al. [35] examined three top MIS journals between 2006 and 2010 inclusive, and identified 49% of the
188 path analysis papers used PLS. Of the 90 papers, some 14% had sample sizes smaller than 80.
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4.1. Measurement model
The properties of the measurement model in Fig. 2 were assessed for reliability and
validity between the observed survey measures and their corresponding latent constructs. The
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purpose of evaluating the measurement model first was to ensure that each measure is reliable
and valid before analysing the structural model [3]. We assessed the two types of reliability

(individual and composite), and two types of validity (convergent and discriminant). We also
tested for common method bias to determine the extent to which our survey method and the
responses may create measurement error and bias our results.
4.1.1. Reliability and validity

Table 3 shows the factor loadings and cross-loadings for each measure to their respective
construct using a confirmatory factor analysis performed using PLS.5 The measures in Table 3
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exclude five measures from the original survey after conducting an exploratory factor analysis.
Based on the recommendations from Carmines and Zeller [10] and Hulland [46], we excluded
two measures of buyer dependence on supplier (BDS1, BDS2) because they cross-loaded onto
more than one factor with similar loadings that exceed the 0.5 threshold; and three measures of
buyer benefits because one measure (BB5) did not load onto any factor with a value greater than
or equal to the 0.5 threshold, and the other two measures (BB9, BB10) because once again, we
could not distinguish which factors they belonged to even though they exceeded the 0.5
threshold.

Table 3 shows that the measurement model demonstrates adequate individual reliability.
We focused on the highest loadings or primary loadings for measures underlying each latent
5

PLS factors are orthogonal and allow for correlated factors [40]. To validate the cross-loadings in PLS, we also ran
the confirmatory factor analysis through SPSS using oblique rotations (OBLIMIN and PROMAX) that allow
correlated factors among orthogonal approaches. We find our cross-loadings robust across our multiple analyses.
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construct [62]. The factor loadings of the measures to their respective construct are shown in
bold and are comfortably above 0.6. The t statistics of these loadings are all significant at p <
0.01. The t value for each measure to their respective construct is shown in brackets in Fig. 2
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below each coefficient. We noted that the secondary factor loadings for embeddedness and buyer
dependence on supplier are greater than the 0.5 threshold, and in some cases greater than 0.6.
Since the primary to secondary discrepancy was sufficiently large (at least 0.2 and usually

between 0.3 to 0.4), we utilised the primary loadings to specify the measures that reflected the
embeddedness and buyer dependence on supplier constructs in our research model in Fig. 1

[62,45]. We also find that the supplier benefit measures loaded onto two factors with primary
and secondary loadings. Similarly, we allowed the supplier benefit measures to represent two
supplier benefit constructs since the loading discrepancies between the two factors were
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sufficiently large [62].

------------------------------Insert Table 3 about here

-------------------------------

Given our analysis in Table 3, we highlighted three items that impact the resultant
research model in Fig. 2. First, the factor analysis showed that the measures for relation-specific
IT use for exploitation and for exploration loaded on one factor. This result is consistent with the
research on organisational learning [51,76,59]. Relation-specific IT use is a combination of
making operational improvements that provide certainty and immediacy in efficiency benefits
(exploitation), together with the need to take risks and make discoveries that can provide future
benefits (exploration). Although it is possible to model all the exploitation and exploration
measures of relation-specific IT use as reflective measures on relation-specific IT use as a single
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construct, we operationalise the exploitation and exploration measures as reflective second-order
constructs - IT use for exploitation and IT use for exploration - representing relation-specific IT
use to be consistent with the conceptualisation in the research literature [50,84].
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Second, the buyer benefit measures loaded onto two factors. The factor analysis showed
that buyers received benefits from two sources: (1) efficiencies in transactions processing
through the ease of using, and the reliability of the IT system, and (2) savings through a

reduction in the time and cost spent on the overall purchasing process. Since this result was

important to understanding the sequential nature of relationship benefits [8], we separated buyer
benefits into efficiency benefits and saving benefits before testing the structural properties of the
research model. Hypothesis 2b (H2b) was tested based on all emergent paths between

embeddedness and buyer efficiency benefits, and buyer saving benefits. Subsequently, H5 was
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tested based on all emergent paths between buyer efficiency benefits, buyer saving benefits, and
buyer dependence on supplier. We also specified and tested a path between buyer efficiency and
saving benefits since the association between efficiency benefits and saving benefits is
axiomatic.

Third, as previously discussed, the factor analysis showed that the supplier benefit
measures load on two factors. Since managers in a supplier business would want to understand
the sequence of how their benefits are derived [8], we specified supplier benefits as internal
benefits and external benefits. Hypothesis 2a (H2a) was tested based on all emergent paths
between embeddedness and internal supplier benefits, and external supplier benefits.
Subsequently, H4 was tested based on all emergent paths between buyer dependence on supplier
and internal supplier benefits and external supplier benefits. We also specified and tested a path
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between internal supplier benefits and external supplier benefits since the association between
internal and external benefits is axiomatic.
Table 4 shows that the measurement model demonstrates adequate composite reliability
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and convergent validity. The measures were robust with their internal consistency reliability

meeting the recommended threshold value of 0.7 and above [69]. Consistent with the guidelines
of Fornell and Larcker [32], the average variance extracted (AVE) for each measure exceeds 0.5.
------------------------------Insert Table 4 about here

-------------------------------

Table 5 shows the results of testing discriminant validity of the measure scale. The

elements in the matrix diagonals (in bold) represent the square root of the AVEs, and are greater
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than the off diagonal elements in their corresponding row and column. Therefore, the table

shows that the seven sets of measures each seem to relate to different latent constructs, and that
each set is discriminated from each other.6

------------------------------Insert Table 5 about here

-------------------------------

4.1.2. Common method bias

In prior discussions on survey development, we explained the process that we took to
minimise common method bias. To confirm the absence of common method bias, we first
6

We note that the inter-construct correlation between embeddedness and buyer dependence on supplier, and internal
and external supplier benefits are greater than the 0.6 threshold. This is consistent with our prior discussions on
primary and secondary loadings between constructs where the secondary loadings are greater than the 0.5 threshold.
There is no cause for concern since differences in the primary to secondary loadings are sufficiently large [62,45].
Furthermore, the square roots of the AVEs are greater than the inter-construct correlation, which show that the
constructs are conceptually distinct and demonstrate discriminant validity [39,14].
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performed a test on our self-reported survey responses using the Harman’s single factor test
[72,43]. Our result showed that the single factor explained 0.277 of the variance, less than the 0.5
or above threshold often used as the benchmark for the existence of common method bias. We
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also performed the unmeasured latent marker construct (ULMC) approach by including a

common method factor in our research model [55]. We evaluated each indicator’s variance

substantively explained by the principal construct and the method factor [55].7 Table 6 shows
that the average variance of the constructs’ indicator is 0.830, whereas the average method-based
variance is 0.000. The small magnitude and insignificance of the method variance confirmed
once again that common method bias was not a concern in our results.
------------------------------Insert Table 6 about here
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------------------------------4.2. Structural model

The structural properties of the research model are shown by the PLS path coefficients
with t statistics in brackets in Fig. 2. The results showed that relation-specific IT use is positively
associated with embeddedness (path = 0.231, t = 2.204, p < 0.01). Therefore, H1 is supported.
Our results showed that relation-specific IT use provided a basis for the supplier to learn about
its relationship with its buyer. Our measures indicated that the combined insights from
exploitation and exploration encouraged a supplier to commence communications with its
buyers. As relation-specific IT use became the primary source of information for a supplierbuyer relationship, deeper levels of embeddedness developed as a supplier has more insights to

7

We note that the efficacy of the ULMC approach for identifying common method bias [55] is still being evaluated
in the current literature [16].
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share, and buyers found unique relation-specific value in socialisation and information sharing
[28]. Our measures (in Appendix B) also indicated that communication, socialisation and
information sharing from relation-specific IT use was accompanied by joint planning and

predictions developed by Uzzi [87].
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problem solving in facilitating an embedded relationship, and is consistent with theoretical

Unexpectedly, the results showed that there is no significant association between
embeddedness and internal supplier benefits (path = 0.089, t = 0.634, ns), and between

embeddedness and external supplier benefits (path = -0.060, t = 0.610, ns). Therefore, H2a is not
supported. However, the results do show that embeddedness is positively associated with buyer
efficiency benefits (path = 0.310, t = 3.610, p < 0.01), and buyer saving benefits (path = 0.307, t
= 3.795, p < 0.01). Therefore, there is support for H2b. Taken together, these results showed the
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outcome of benefit sharing between a supplier and powerful buyers evident in the research

literature [84,22,19,73,67,91]; a one-sided flow of benefits that goes to the buyer. These results
were somewhat surprising since embeddedness is supposed to have elevated a supplier and
buyer’s concern for each other’s values, attributes, goals and benefits [37,27,87,28]. Therefore,
the view that embeddedness is a capability that provides an informal self-enforcing mechanism
for relational governance of power buyers did not bear out in our results. Uzzi [87] may have an
explanation for our results. He speculates that when there are high levels of embeddedness, there
may be an inability to govern through trust, information sharing and joint problem solving
because feelings of obligations, friendship or betrayal become so intense that either or both
parties sacrifice benefits for each other.
The model results showed that embeddedness is positively associated with buyer
dependence on supplier (path = 0.564, t = 6.948, p < 0.01), and this supported H3. Despite a
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power differential favouring a buyer, embeddedness can remind a buyer about recognising and
appreciating the unique and valuable resources and capabilities that are provided by a supplier
[Medcof 2001]. These resources and capabilities encompass the empathy, values, attitudes,
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collaboration and goals that support the partnership’s value creation and sharing [38]. In the end,
the business friendship is a unique and valuable one that is worthy of balancing the power in the
relationship through a buyer’s dependence on a supplier [49].
4.2.1. Mediating effects

To test for evidence of buyer dependence on supplier as a mediating variable, the tests
using the causal steps approach as suggested by Baron and Kenny [5] were performed. The

mediating effect of buyer dependence on supplier on the association between embeddedness and
internal supplier benefits was examined by performing tests for statistical significance with the
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whole model as a unit rather than isolating the mediation piece of the model and conducting tests
without the presence of the other constructs and indicators [35]. The direct effect of
embeddedness on internal supplier benefits yielded a test statistic of 0.174 (p < 0.1), but this
decreased to 0.085 (ns) when buyer dependence on supplier was included as the mediator. This
indicated that buyer dependence on supplier fully mediated the relationship between
embeddedness and internal supplier benefits. The results also showed that buyer dependence on
supplier is positively associated with internal supplier benefits (path = 0.189, t = 1.736, p <
0.05), but the association is not significant in relation to external supplier benefits (path = 0.002,
t = 0.022, ns). External supplier benefits were created following internal supplier benefits (path =
0.623, t = 7.665, p < 0.01). Therefore, H4 was only partially supported. Consistent with the prior
research literature [63,18,27,70], we found that buyer dependence on supplier allowed a supplier
to reduce its internally generated operating costs (e.g., a reduction in management costs) because
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a supplier did not have to spend as much time and effort in maintaining its embedded
relationship with buyers. Reduced operating costs provided for increased margins, which in turn,
led to externally generated benefits. Our results provided evidence that a supplier generated its
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benefits sequentially, first through internal benefits, followed by external benefits. This process
of affecting intermediate and final output variables was consistent with the process of tracing and
measuring IT business value [8]. The supplier may also obtain an increase in margin by taking
advantage of discretionary changes in prices and charges, made possible by buyer dependence on
supplier [63,18].

Finally, the results showed that buyer efficiency benefits were not significantly associated
with buyer dependence on supplier (path = 0.006, t = 0.065, ns). Efficiency benefits led to buyer
saving benefits (path = 0.304, t = 2.378, p < 0.01), which in turn, was associated with buyer
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dependence on supplier (path = 0.224, t = 2.237, p < 0.01). Again, our results supported existing
research on the process of tracing and measuring IT benefits by demonstrating that as buyers
received efficiency benefits, saving benefits followed sequentially [8]. Following these results,
the mediating effect of buyer dependence on supplier on the association between buyer saving
benefits and internal supplier benefits was examined with the whole model as a unit rather than
isolating the mediation piece of the model and conducting tests without the presence of the other
constructs and indicators [35]. The direct effect of buyer saving benefits on internal supplier
benefits yielded a test statistic of -0.037 (ns), but this decreased to -0.069 (ns) when buyer
dependence on supplier was included as the mediator. This showed that buyer dependence on
supplier fully mediates the relationship between buyer saving benefits and internal supplier
benefits [5]. Therefore, H5 was only partially supported. Tangible savings from efficiency
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benefits created buyer dependence on supplier from the point of view of the buyer, and this
allowed the supplier to appropriate its share of the relational benefits [63,18].
We also conducted mediation tests with bootstrapping over the Sobel test [81,82] as
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recommended by Preacher and Hayes [74,75]. These tests required the specification of single
mediator models (isolating the mediation piece of the model), and applying a nonparametric
resampling procedure (repeated thousands of times) in an additional method for testing

mediation that does not impose the assumption of normality of the sampling distribution [75]. In
our bootstrap results, we found significant effects between embeddedness and buyer saving
benefits and our mediator, buyer dependence on supplier respectively; however, the effects
between buyer dependence on supplier and internal supplier benefits were not significant.

Furthermore, the direct effects between embeddedness and internal supplier benefits, and buyer
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saving benefits and internal supplier benefits were also not significant. We attributed these

results to the lack of holistic consideration of our research model since we isolated the mediation
model from the whole model when we performed the bootstrapping [35]. We also attributed
these results to the lack of correct parameterisation surrounding the constructs since we had to
use equal weights rather than optimal weights for the indicators (as performed by PLS) for each
construct [35]. We also note that the existing literature on mediation analysis is inconclusive, and
the current thinking is that mediation exists whether tests show either partial or full mediation
[92]. In the end, we found support for mediation, and for completeness, report both the Baron
and Kenny [5] and Preacher and Hayes [74] procedures.
4.2.2. Effect size
Since PLS makes no distributional assumption other than predictor specification in its
procedure for estimating parameters, traditional parametric-based techniques for significance
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testing/evaluation would not be appropriate [14]. Therefore, evaluation of PLS models should
apply prediction-based measures that are also nonparametric. We used the R2 for each dependent
construct provided by PLS and performed Chin’s [14] effect size f2 test to see whether the impact
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of a particular independent construct on a dependent construct has substantive impact. Using
Cohen’s [17] operational definition for effect sizes, levels of high (> 0.35), medium (> 0.15) and
small (> 0.02) effect sizes are presented for each of the independent constructs on their

corresponding dependent constructs in Fig. 3. The effect sizes show the dominant paths which
explain the most variance in the model. The effect sizes were consistent with our structural
model results.

------------------------------Insert Fig. 3 about here
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We also performed the Q2 test, a predictive sample reuse technique developed by Stone
[83] and Geisser [33] to test for predictive power. This technique represents a synthesis of crossvalidation and function-fitting with the view that “the prediction of observables or potential
observables is of much greater relevance than the estimation of what are often artificial
construct-parameters” [33, pp. 320]. We applied a blindfolding procedure that omits a part of the
data for a particular block of indicators during parameter estimations and then estimate the
omitted part using the estimated parameters. This procedure is repeated until every data point has
been omitted and estimated. The resulting Q2 value is a generalised cross-validation measure and
jackknife standard deviations of parameter estimates [14]. If the Q2 value for a construct is
greater than zero, this indicates that its explanatory latent construct exhibits predictive relevance
[39]. All of our dependent variables, embeddedness (0.050), buyer dependence on supplier
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(0.343), buyer efficiency benefits (0.068), buyer saving benefits (0.175), internal supplier
benefits (0.015) and external supplier benefits (0.006) were greater than zero.
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4.2.3. Post hoc analysis
Following the analysis of the measurement and structural model, we examined three
issues post hoc: (1) the high correlation between embeddedness and buyer dependence on
supplier, and whether this raises concern with the causal direction hypothesised between

constructs; (2) explore whether there were additional relationships present in the model that were
not hypothesised; and (3) pursued explanations for the association between buyer dependence on
supplier and internal supplier benefits (path = 0.189, t = 1.736, p < 0.05), since p < 0.05 rather
than p < 0.01 and R2 = 0.04.

Contrary to the relational view and RDT arguments presented in our theory and
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hypotheses development section, we tested a model that directly associated relation-specific IT
use with buyer dependence on supplier, and buyer dependence on supplier with embeddedness.
The result showed that relation-specific IT use was not associated with buyer dependence on
supplier nor was there a significant relationship between buyer dependence on supplier and
embeddedness or any relational benefits. Therefore, there was no requirement for an association
analysis involving Cohen’s path analysis [86]. Consistent with the theoretical complementarities
of relational view and RDT, our results suggested that embeddedness, which is unique and
valuable, must be accompanied by buyer dependence on supplier to appropriate benefits.8

8

A similar phenomenon involves insurance advertising. Insurers can use customer-specific information to help save
their customers money only if they first establish a connection or relationship (embeddedness). Once the insurer
saves the customer money through the relationship, this saving makes a customer dependent on its insurer (buyer
dependence on supplier).
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To explore whether there were additional relationships present in the model, we tested a
fully saturated model which we presented in Fig. 2. Therefore, we were able to show that the
links between constructs that were not hypothesised were not significant.
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We note that the association between buyer dependence on supplier and internal supplier
benefits was not as strong as we would have liked (Fig. 2 showed p < 0.05 rather than p < 0.01).
Furthermore, the 4% R2 between buyer dependence on supplier and internal supplier benefits is
low, and this may suggest that our model could benefit from a moderating variable that would
allow a supplier the choice to exercise its power from buyer dependence that would lead to
supplier benefits. We conducted some anecdotal discussions with the supplier’s account

managers after the survey was completed. These discussions indicated that the association

between buyer dependence on supplier, internal supplier benefits and external supplier benefits
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may be explained by a time lag between the times a supplier exercises its dependency power, and
the time it takes to receive internal and external benefits. It would seem that these discussions
were consistent with the intermediate and final effects of IT business value as expressed by
Barua et al. [8]. Ultimately, we are not able to determine whether there is a need for a
moderating variable or whether it is a time lag effect using our cross-sectional study. A
longitudinal study is one approach to answering this question.
5.

Conclusion

Extant literature on B2B ecommerce has demonstrated relational benefits from relationspecific IT systems in a hub and spoke representation of partnerships [1,91]. Taking a relational
view, these relational benefits are possible since the supplier and buyer have invested in an IT
system and shared knowledge that are unique and valuable to the partnership [27]. However, the
large buyers such as retailers and automobile manufacturers often act as dominant leaders, and
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despite partner dependence, the relational benefits created by a relation-specific IT system are
appropriated by buyers because of a buyer’s power advantage over a supplier [77,84,13,91].
Therefore, using the relational view as a theoretical lens [27], we examined the question of
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whether a supplier can raise buyer dependence on supplier to appropriate its share of relational
benefits. Our study is focused on a supplier’s perspective, and we hypothesised and found that
the relative power between a supplier and its more powerful buyers is reduced through the

process of creating embeddedness and making buyers aware of their dependence on a supplier.
We developed and tested a research model that showed how a supplier could associate its
relation-specific IT use with embeddedness to appropriate relational benefits since

embeddedness is a capability that involves more nuanced knowledge-sharing routines and

effective self-enforcing governance [64,84,13,27,87]. We found that relation-specific IT use was
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associated with embeddedness which created operating efficiencies and savings for buyers

(supported by H1 and H2b). However, embeddedness was not directly associated with supplier
benefits (H2a is not supported). Our results did not seem to be consistent with the existing
prediction of the relational view [27]. Uzzi [87] speculates that perhaps high levels of
embeddedness had reduced its self-enforcing governance properties. Such speculation provides
an opportunity for future research.

In our theory and model development, we utilised RDT to create a more complete and
rigorous research model using buyer dependence on supplier as an important construct for
explaining the process and dynamics of what a supplier can do to appropriate its share of
relational benefits in the presence of powerful buyers. Consequently, we tested the association
between embeddedness, buyer dependence on supplier and relational benefits. We found that
embeddedness reduced a buyer’s power advantage by association with buyer dependence on
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supplier (supported by H3). Our results showed that embeddedness was associated with buyer
dependence on supplier and this mediating association was relied on for supplier benefits
(partially supported by H4). In addition, we found that buyer dependence on supplier mediated
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buyer benefits and supplier benefits (partially supported by H5). In conclusion, our research
showed that embeddedness and supplier benefits are not always associated as theory and
empirical studies predict [13,87,28]. Rather, we found that the association between

embeddedness and buyer dependence on supplier facilitated the appropriation of supplier
benefits that would otherwise go to the buyer.
5.1. Implications for theory

The relational view of interorganisational competitive advantage goes beyond the search
for competitive advantage that focuses on resources and capabilities within the firm (resource-
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based view), and explains that such advantage can also be gained when trading partners are

willing to make relation-specific investments and work together in unique ways [27]. The other
side of relation-specific resources and capabilities in trading partners is the implicit dependence
that emerges from unique and valuable interorganisational resources and capabilities [63,70].
Although they are distinct, we advocate that the relational view and RDT are complementary
theories because of similarity in their fundamental concepts for generating relational value. The
relational view holds that relational benefits come from unique and valuable interorganisational
resources and capabilities, and this concept of a unique and valuable interorganisational resource
is very close in meaning to the importance and scarcity of the shared resource from an RDT
perspective. Our findings show that a supplier is required to engage in embeddedness to provide
the knowledge sharing and relational problem solving routines, but buyer dependence on
supplier is required to effectively govern the relational benefit sharing in the presence of
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differential power between a supplier and buyer. Our results provide support for the
complementary theoretical connections between the relational view and RDT.
Our findings also provided empirical evidence for measuring IT business value as process
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of tracing and measuring intermediate and final output variables [8]. Internal and external buyer
and supplier benefits were identified by our factor analysis, and our analyses showed that

internal benefits were earned before external benefits were earned. This is consistent with the
view in Barua et al. [8] that the sequential nature of IT business value also applies to the creation
of relational benefits using relation-specific IT and complementary interorganisational
capabilities.

Finally, we supplement MIS research by operationalising relation-specific IT use through
the strategic management research on organisational learning [59] rather than referring to use in
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terms of the outcome of use [64,21]. Our definition of relation-specific IT use was

comprehensive, and captured a supplier’s ability to learn through exploitation and exploration.
Both types of learning simultaneously allow a firm to be ambidextrous by achieving short-term
performance through operational improvement and long-term performance by discovery and
innovation [51,76,59].

5.2. Implications for practice

Our research has practical implications for suppliers who deal with powerful buyers. We
developed and tested a package of complementary capabilities that can be used with relationspecific IT to reduce the power differential that cause relational benefits to be appropriated by
the powerful buyer at the expense of the supplier. A supplier could develop an embedded
relationship with its buyers and create buyer dependence on supplier; and both of these
capabilities could be used to find an equitable working relationship that share in relational
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benefits. We also suggest that suppliers use relation-specific IT comprehensively. A supplier
must improve its operational efficiencies and reduce costs (exploitation) to ensure short-term
performance, while simultaneously take risk to innovate, build new capabilities and consider new

5.3. Limitations
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lines of business that would ensure sustainable long-term performance (exploration).

Like all research, there were a number of limitations in our study. First, our sample was
limited to a single supplier to ensure that we could test a pure supplier model without having to
control for varying levels of power that would exist in a sample of suppliers. Our research model
only required buyer-side controls. Therefore, our results may not be consistent across

competitors in the same market sector or suppliers in other sectors. Second, our study is limited
to a supplier’s perspective on appropriating relational benefits using a causal research model and

Ac
ce
pt
ed

cross-sectional data, and does not allow for the proper determination of whether there are any
time-lagged, sequential, or feedback effects among the constructs that were studied in the
research model. For example, we were unable to measure or test any sequential or feedback
effects of embeddedness or buyer dependence on supplier that may have subsequent or feedback
impacts on supplier dependence on buyer and supplier benefits. Lagged, sequential or feedback
effects would be questions for future research that utilise longitudinal research techniques.
However, we can speculate that these effects may be limited since suppliers are able to garner
buyer dependence on supplier and appropriate relational benefits in our research model. Finally,
by measuring the perceptions of the respondents at a single point in time, we note that it is not
entirely possible to make causal statements with respect to any of the relationships considered in
the research model. Rather, the direction of associations can only be inferred from our chosen
theoretical base.
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Table 1
Buyer responses – control variables and demographic questions.
4.21 years

(n=77)*

Average time with current account manager

1.93 years

(n=77)

Average size of account

A$382,686 per year

(n=59)

Expectation that account will grow in the next year
Average account growth in the next year
Average percentage of purchases electronically

82.11%

(n=67)

2.64%

(n=58)

74.92%

(n=77 )*
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* control variable
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Average time as a <Supplier Name> buyer

40
Page 42 of 55

© 2015. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommerical-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License, http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Table 2
Supplier responses – control variables and demographic questions.
3.94 years

(n=77)

Average time as account manager for a buyer

1.82 years

(n=77)

Average size of buyer account

$777,759 per year

(n=77)*
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Average time of buyer association with <Supplier Name>

Expectation that buyer account will grow in the next year

91.80%

(n=73)

Average buyer account growth in the next year

4.11%

(n=75)

69.53%

(n=77)

Average buyer account percent of total account portfolio

11.04%

(n=74)

Probability of keeping the buyer account

68.92%

(n=74)

Average percentage of buyer sales electronically
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* control variable, 5 observations imputed using MLE.
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Table 3
Factor loadings (bold) and cross-loadings.*
BB Sav

EM

BB11_ont_del
BB12_high_fulfil

0.387
0.401

0.878
0.886

0.356

BB1_red_time

0.786

BB2_red_cost

0.796

BB3_imp_serv

0.915

0.401

BB4_imp_satis

0.914
0.315

0.422

BB6_reliab_ord
BB7_easy_use

0.353

0.856

BB8_acc_ord

0.887
0.861

EM1_disc_val

0.403

EM2_cduct_rev

0.500

0.307

EM3_share_info
EM4_mful_disc

0.350

EM5_prob_solv

0.324

EM6_iss_ctract

R-S IT
Use

SB Ext

SB Int

0.426

0.493

0.309

0.348

0.359

0.393

0.349

0.897

0.544

0.911

0.593

0.825

0.564

0.936

0.556

0.834

0.538
0.647

0.860

SB1_inc_sale
SB2_inc_salegrw

BDS
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BB Eff

0.432

0.891

0.514

0.367

0.928
0.496

0.557
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SB3_red_mgtcost

SB4_inc_pcesharespd

0.376

0.878

0.322

0.859
0.584

SB5_inc_gpm
SB6_inc_ROI

0.852
0.513
0.615
0.888

BDS3_neg_price

0.439

0.608

0.877

BDS4_neg_serv

0.427

0.644

0.905

BDS5_find_alt

0.472

0.503

0.823

BDS6_influ_proddec

0.302

0.484

0.820

0.555

0.874

0.314

BDS7_influ_servdec
UI1_prov_webord

UI2_prov_selfserv

0.785

0.309

0.303

0.711

UI3_inform_org

0.756

UI4_auto_restk

0.647

UI5_min_ord

0.707

UI6_auto_rep

0.798

0.412

0.755

0.375

UI7_info_cap

0.352

UI8_restruct_purch

0.696

UI9_integ_is

0.720

UX1_ana_spend

0.801

UX2_ana_ctract

0.746

UX3_know_pref

0.804

0.326

0.351

0.433

0.343

0.400

0.316
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UX4_targ_techapp

0.774

UX5_ana_subst

0.810

0.450

0.355
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*Factor loading < 0.3 are excluded.
BB - Buyer Benefits, BB Eff - Buyer Efficiency Benefits, BB Sav - Buyer Savings Benefits, EM - Embeddedness,
R-S IT Use – Relation-specific IT Use, SB – Supplier Benefits, SB Ext - External Supplier Benefits, SB Int Internal Supplier Benefits, BDS – Buyer Dependence on Supplier, UI – IT Use for Exploitation, UX – IT Use for
Exploration.
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Table 4
Composite reliability and convergent validity.

BB Sav - Buyer Saving Benefits
EM - Embeddedness
R-S IT Use - Relation-Specific IT Use
SB Ext - External Supplier Benefits
SB Int - Internal Supplier Benefits

Dillion-Goldstein’s Rho

Cronbachs Alpha

Average Variance
Extracted (AVE)

0.915

0.876

0.731

0.942

0.924

0.763

0.953

0.941

0.771

0.948

0.941

0.566

0.938

0.912

0.791

0.862

0.680

0.757

0.934

0.912

0.741

Ac
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BDS - Buyer Dependence on Supplier

Composite Reliability:

M
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ipt

BB Eff - Buyer Efficiency Benefits

Composite Reliability:
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Table 5
Discriminant validity (inter-correlations) of variable constructs.
CB Sav

EM

R-S IT Use

SB Ext

SB Int

BDS

BB Eff
BB Sav

0.855
0.399

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

EM

0.402

0
0.874
0.311

0

0

0

0

R-S IT Use

0.219

0.200

0.878
0.258

0

0

0

SB Ext

0.087

0.127

0

0

SB Int

0.041

0.087

0

BDS

0.449

0.267

0.870
0.189

M
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ipt

CB Eff

0.050

0.752
0.395

0.173

0.335

0.889
0.623

0.655

0.140

0.083

0.861

Ac
ce
pt
ed

BB Eff - Buyer Efficiency Benefits, BB Sav - Buyer Savings Benefits, EM - Embeddedness, R-S IT Use – Relationspecific IT Use, SB Ext - External Supplier Benefits, SB Int - Internal Supplier Benefits, BDS – Buyer Dependence
on Supplier.
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Table 6
Common method bias analysis.

BDS

BBEff

BBSav

SBInt
SBExt

Substantive Factor
Loading (R1)
0.809***
0.613***
0.889***
0.685***
0.894***
0.617***
0.624***
0.744***
0.677***
0.812***
0.917***
0.753***
0.599***
0.914***
0.954***
0.810***
0.945***
0.950***
0.788***
0.823***
0.829***
0.893***
0.773***
0.873***
0.935***
0.857***
0.872***
0.935***
0.867***
0.845***
0.808***
0.705***
0.943***
0.950***
0.868***
0.873***
0.866***
0.925***
0.882***
0.887***

Method Factor
Loading (R2)
-0.025
0.074
-0.130
-0.053
-0.227**
0.208**
0.152
-0.041
0.065
-0.002
-0.175*
0.083
0.168
-0.101
-0.083
0.146
-0.172
-0.015
0.065
0.049
0.073
0.008
0.086
-0.070
-0.098
0.080
0.003
-0.106
-0.014
0.036
0.003
0.111
-0.037
-0.061
0.005
-0.005
0.079
0.016
0.000
-0.103

R12
0.654
0.375
0.791
0.469
0.799
0.380
0.389
0.553
0.458
0.660
0.841
0.567
0.359
0.834
0.910
0.656
0.893
0.903
0.622
0.677
0.687
0.798
0.597
0.761
0.874
0.735
0.761
0.875
0.751
0.715
0.653
0.497
0.888
0.903
0.753
0.762
0.750
0.856
0.777
0.786

R22
0.001
0.006
0.017
0.003
0.052
0.043
0.023
0.002
0.004
0.000
0.031
0.007
0.028
0.010
0.007
0.021
0.029
0.000
0.004
0.002
0.005
0.000
0.007
0.005
0.010
0.006
0.000
0.011
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.012
0.001
0.004
0.000
0.000
0.006
0.000
0.000
0.011

M
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EM

Measure
UI1
UI2
UI3
UI4
UI5
UI6
UI7
UI8
UI9
UX1
UX2
UX3
UX4
UX5
EM1
EM2
EM3
EM4
EM5
EM6
BDS3
BDS4
BDS5
BDS6
BDS7
BB6
BB7
BB8
BB11
BB12
BB1
BB2
BB3
BB4
SB3
SB6
SB1
SB2
SB4
SB5

Ac
ce
pt
ed

Construct
R-S
IT Use

46
Page 48 of 55

© 2015. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommerical-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License, http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Average

0.830

0.699

0.000

0.009

*p <0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.

Ac
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R-S IT Use – Relation-specific IT Use, EM - Embeddedness, BDS – Buyer Dependence on Supplier, BB Eff Buyer Efficiency Benefits, BB Sav - Buyer Savings Benefits, SB Ext - External Supplier Benefits, SB Int - Internal
Supplier Benefits.
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Supplier
benefits
H2a
+

M
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cr
ipt

Relationspecific IT use

H1
+

H4
+

H3
+

Embeddedness

H2b
+

Buyer
dependence on
supplier

H5
+

Ac
ce
pt
ed

Buyer benefits

Fig. 1. Research model.
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0.791***
(16.049)

0.729***
(11.590)

0.784***
(15.893)

0.707***
(11.545)

0.761***
(14.957)

0.802***
(21.087)

0.756***
(12.367)

0.707***
(10.926)

UI2

UI3

UI4

UI5

UI6

UI7

UI8

0.898***
(23.783)

EM2

Relationspecific
IT use

0.971***
(136.152)

IT use for
exploitation
R2 = 0.942

EM1

EM4

0.231***
(2.204)

0.859***
(24.452)

UX1

UX2

BB6

0.890***
(36.783)

UX5

0.310***
(3.610)

Buyer
efficiency
benefits
R2 = 0.097

BB7

BB8

BB11

BB12

0.884***
(18.228)

0.006
(0.065)

0.304***
(2.378)

Buyer
dependence on
supplier
R2 = 0.469

0.224***
(2.237)

BB1

BB2

BB3

BB4

0.787*** 0.793*** 0.916*** 0.916***
(10.485) (14.079) (38.073) (37.270)

BDS7

BDS6

0.818***
(18.303)
0.870***
(19.205)

BDS5

BDS4

BDS3

SB5

SB4

SB2

SB1

0.857***
(26.473)

0.876***
(24.626)

0.929***
(46.861)

0.826***
(16.079)

0.906***
(43.269)

0.878***
(30.910)

External
supplier
benefits
R2 = 0.389

0.623***
(7.665)

0.002
(0.022)

Buyer saving
benefits
R2 = 0.245

0.189**
(1.736)

Internal
supplier
benefits
R2 = 0.040

0.893***
(20.970)
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Fig. 2. Measurement and structural properties of the research model.

UI – IT use for exploitation, UX – IT use for exploration, EM - Embeddedness, BDS - Buyer dependence on supplier, BB - Buyer benefits, SB - Supplier benefits.

0.888***
(12.743)

*p < 0.1
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01
one-tailed tests

0.711***
(11.232)

IT use for
exploration
R2 = 0.883

0.940***
(65.307)

0.307***
(3.795)

0.564***
(6.948)

SB6

0.892***
(26.405)
0.848***
(22.870)

SB3

-0.060
(0.610)

0.089
(0.634)

0.859***
(10.811) 0.864*** 0.874***
(11.298) (18.228)

Embeddedness
R2 = 0.054

UX4

UX3

0.883***
(32.643)

0.888***
(22.446)

0.740***
(13.131)

UI9

EM6

0.833*** 0.858***
(14.164) (22.066)

EM5

0.910*** 0.827*** 0.937***
(40.369) (18.376) (34.080)

EM3

A
c
c
e
p
t
e
d

UI1
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Internal
supplier
benefits
R2 = 0.040

Relationspecific
IT use

Cannot be
calculated

Not Sig. (f2<0.02)
Small (f2>0.02)

Medium (f2>0.15)

Buyer
dependence on
supplier
R2 = 0.469

Buyer
efficiency
benefits
R2 = 0.097

Buyer saving
benefits
R2 = 0.245

Ac
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ed

Large (f2>0.35)

Embeddedness
R2 = 0.054

M
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us
cr
ipt

External
supplier
benefits
R2 = 0.389

Fig. 3. Effect sizes.
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Appendix A. Supplier survey constructs and measures

M
an
us
cr
ipt

IT Use for Exploitation – UI
In your relationship with this buyer, please indicate the extent to which you use information systems and processes
for the following (0 = no basis to answer, 1 = not at all, 5 = extensive use):
UI1_prov_webord:
To provide this buyer with web-based ordering capabilities. E.g., ordering, approval,
tracking, budgeting, stock control.
UI2_prov_selfserv:
To provide this buyer with specialised/customised self-service capabilities. E.g.,
print online custom stationery, promotional marketing.
UI3_inform_org:
To keep this buyer informed of <Supplier Name> initiatives. E.g., email advice
about new products, changes in services, events.
UI4_auto_restk:
To automate the reporting function for this buyer. E.g., office supplies cabinets,
custom stationery replenishment.
UI5_ min_ord:
To monitor when this buyer does NOT meet the minimum purchase order sizes.
UI6_auto_rep:
To automate the reporting function for this buyer. E.g., purchasing reports, contract
compliance reports.
UI7_info_cap:
To provide this buyer with web-based information capabilities. E.g., view catalogue
of products and availability, conduct searches.
UI8_restruct_purch:
To allow this buyer to restructure their purchasing function. E.g., decentralised
purchasing, delivery to desktop, eliminate office supplies warehouse.
UI9_integ_is:
To integrate this buyer’s own information systems and processes with <Supplier
Name>. E.g., electronic invoicing.

Ac
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IT Use for Exploration – UX
In your relationship with this buyer, please indicate the extent to which you use information systems and processes
for the following (0 = no basis to answer, 1 = not at all, 5 = extensive use):
UX1_ana_spend:
To analyse this buyer’s spending patterns for new sales opportunities. E.g., crossselling, up-selling opportunities.
UX2_ana_cotract:
To analyse contact history with this buyer for the purpose of optimising sales calls
and visits.
UX3_know_pref:
To know the product/service preferences of this buyer better.
UX4_targ_techapp:
To effectively target innovative applications of technology to this buyer for new
sales opportunities. E.g., print online custom stationery, promotional marketing.
UX5_ana_subst:
To analyse this buyer’s spending patterns in order to recommend product substitutes
that are in line with their objectives and specifications. E.g., <Supplier Name>
branded photocopy paper, environmentally friendly products.
Supplier Benefits - SB
Please indicate the extent to which the following benefits have been received from this buyer over the course of the
relationship (0 = no basis to answer, 1 = not at all, 5 = great extent):
SB1_inc_sale:
Increase in sales.
SB2_inc_salegrw:
Increase in sales growth.
SB3_red_mgtcost:
Reduction in <Supplier Name>’s account management costs.
SB4_inc_pcesharespd:
Increase in the percentage share of the buyer’s total spending on all lines of business
provided by <Supplier Name>.
SB5_inc_gpm:
Increase in the gross profit margin received.
SB6_inc_ROI:
Increase in the ROI (Return On Investment) from this buyer.
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Appendix B. Buyer survey constructs and measures
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Embeddedness – EM
Please indicate the extent to which the following OTHER activities occur in your relationship with the buyer (0 = no
basis to answer, 1 = not at all, 5 = great extent):
EM1_disc_val:
Your account manager discusses how information systems and processes provided
by <Supplier Name> adds value to your organisation. E.g., ability to comply with
your organisational policies, requirements for social responsibilities.
EM2_cduct_rev:
Your account manager conducts regular performance reviews with you. E.g.,
assistance in managing expenditure, controlling order sizes, diverting deliveries to
different locations.
EM3_share_info:
You share proprietary information with <Supplier Name>. E.g., purchasing budgets,
purchasing plans, strategic plans.
EM4_mful_disc:
Your account manager has meaningful discussions with you about how to interpret
information about your account. E.g., discussions about <Supplier Name> reports.
EM5_prob_solv:
Your account manager engages in joint problem solving with you. E.g., solving
problems as they occur, developing innovative solutions.
EM6_iss_ctract:
When issues come up, your account manager manages the relationship by reference
to the terms of the contract.
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Buyer Dependence on Supplier - BDS
Please select ONE response to each of the following statements (0 = no basis to answer, 1 = not at all, 5 = very
high):
BDS1_prod_impt:
The extent to which <Supplier Name> provides your organisation with PRODUCTS
that are important is:
BDS2_serv_impt:
The extent to which <Supplier Name> provides your organisation with SERVICES
that are important is:
BDS3_neg_price:
Overall, the extent to which your organisation can negotiate hard on PRICE with
<Supplier Name> is:
BDS4_neg_serv:
Overall, the extent to which your organisation can negotiate hard on SERVICES
with <Supplier Name> is:
BDS5_fin_alt:
At contract renewal, the effort involved in finding ALTERNATIVE suppliers for the
products and services offered by <Supplier Name> is:
BDS6_influ_proddec:
The extent to which <Supplier Name> influences your organisation’s decisions with
respect to their new and/or existing PRODUCTS is:
BDS7_influ_servdec:
The extent to which <Supplier Name> influences your organisation’s decisions with
respect to their new and/or existing SERVICES is:
Buyer Benefits - BB
Please indicate the extent to which the following benefits have been received from <Supplier Name> over the course
of the relationship (0 = no basis to answer, 1 = not at all, 5 = great extent):
BB1_red_time:
Reduction in the time spent on purchasing your organisation’s requirements.
BB2_red_cost:
Reduction in the cost of purchasing your organisation’s requirements.
BB3_imp_serv:
Improved buyer service on average.
BB4_imp_satis:
Improved buyer satisfaction on average.
BB5_prov_custmserv:
Customised services that are offered by <Supplier Name> to meet your organisation
specifically. E.g., merchandising, uniforms.
BB6_reliab_ord:
A reliable ordering system
BB7_easy_use:
An ordering process that is easy to use.
BB8_acc-ord:
An accurate ordering process.
BB9_red_tc:
A reduced cost of transacting. E.g., automating the administration of office supply
spending, visibility of product availability.
BB10_ease_custm:
Ease of customisation to suit your requirements. E.g., ordering, reporting.
BB11_ont_del:
On-time delivery across all business lines from <Supplier Name>.
BB12_high_fulfil:
High fulfillment rates across all business lines from <Supplier Name>.
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Appendix C. Control measures and demographic questions
Supplier Survey
spend_cus:

What is the current approximate size (revenue) of this account? (Respond in $
amount)
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Approximately, how long has this buyer been associated with <Supplier Name>? (Respond in years and months)
Approximately, how long have you been an account manager for this buyer? (Respond in years and months)

Do you expect this account to grow or decline in size (revenue) over the next year? (Respond Grow or Decline)
What is the expected growth/decline in size (revenue) of this account over the next year? (Respond in %)

The following describes methods in which a buyer can use to purchase from <Supplier Name>. Please indicate the
current PERCENTAGE of purchase orders received from this buyer using each method. (Respond in percentage for
each method)
x % purchases that are conducted by phoning in orders through the call centre.
x % purchases that are conducted by faxing and/or emailing in orders.
x % purchases that are conducted through information systems.
x % purchases that are conducted by exchanging purchase orders, invoices and payments through integrated
systems (e.g., EDI and/or XML).
What is the approximate size of this account as a proportion of your accounts? Please enter a number between 0 and
100.
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What is the likelihood or probability of keeping the account at the time of renewal? Please enter a number between 0
and 100.

Buyer Survey
long_cus:

purch_pce:

Approximately, how long has your organisation been a buyer of <Supplier Name>?
(Respond in years and months)

The following describes methods in which your organisation can use to purchase
from <Supplier Name>. Please indicate the current PERCENTAGE of purchase
orders made using each method. (Respond in percentage for each method)
x % purchases that are conducted by phoning in orders through the call centre.
x % purchases that are conducted by faxing and/or emailing in orders.
x % purchases that are conducted through information systems.
x % purchases that are conducted by exchanging purchase orders, invoices and
payments through integrated systems (e.g., EDI and/or XML).

Approximately, how long has the current Account Manager been assigned to your account? (Respond in years and
months)
What is the current approximate size (spend) of your account? (Respond in $ amount)
Do you expect your account to grow or decline in size (spend) over the next year? (Respond Grow or Decline)
What is the expected growth/decline in size (spend) of this account over the next year? (Respond in %)
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